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Organizational Picketing in
American Law
By TmL L. Bomasrn *
Introduction
cDURWnG A RECMT strike a small boy sat on a fence near the
works concerned and ate chocolates, whistling in the gladness of
his heart between each toothsome morsel. In reality he was a
'picket,' and was marking and counting the men who entered the
works."' This late Nineteenth Century description of a trade
union "picket" is a good example of picketing in its denotative
sense.
The term "picket" is not a legal mot rart. In its generic sense
"to picket" means merely to patrol or guard a particular area.2
Its origin in the law of labor relations lies in the violent strikes
of Nineteenth Century England. Picketing then referred to the
practice of striking workers who met at the gates of their em-
ployer and tried to induce other workmen-by word of mouth
and sometimes by violence-not to enter the struck premises.
In modern America, picketing has acquired a different con-
notative meaning. As a familiar institution in the United States,
picketing generally refers to the practice of walking before the
premises of an employer with a placard which bears some legend.
Because there are usually several workers who carry these plac-
ards, the term "picket line" has become rather widespread in the
American, industrial relations vocabulary.
Picketing in France is almost unknown in this American sense.
As in Nineteenth Century England, French workers on strike
merely assemble before the gates of the struck plant, and French
* B.A., University of Louisville; LL.B., Harvard. Partner, Segal and Born-
stein Law Firm, Louisville, Ky.
1 W. J. Shaxby, The Case Against Picketing 11, London (1897).
2 p. H. Casselnan, The Labor Dictionary 362 (1949).
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labor law does not govern picketing specifically as an industrial
weapon. It is dealt with only as a matter of general police regula-
tion.
3
Until the 1940's, the picket line in America was used by trade
unions primarily during strikes, and in such situations the picket
line is best known. It has become an important symbol of organ-
ized labor, as well as an economic weapon. It has even been
memorialized in folk songs and in rather bad proletarian litera-
ture.
Because of its primary identification with strikes, some stu-
dents of the labor movement have speculated that the courts and
the public have conceptual difficulty in understanding the role of
picketing when used for other purposes. In the rapidly changing
context of American industrial relations, however, the picket line
has become a truly utilitarian labor weapon.
Although the picket line is today still used in strikes, it is em-
ployed by unions for many other purposes. Familiar examples in-
clude its use to demand recognition from a recalcitrant employer
who refuses to deal with the union of his employees' choice; to
protest the sale and use of non-union made or struck goods; to
protest the introduction of job displacing automatic machinery;
to protest racial discrimination; to protest arbitrary discharges,
et cetera. It has even been alleged that a Teamsters' local in
Portland, Oregon, has used a picket line to compel a tavern owner
to install pinball machines in which certain union officials had a
Tiancial interest.4
During the past fifteen years, a new and highly controversial
type of picketing has grown increasingly important in union
organizing campaigns, so-called "organizational picketing." Em-
ployers detest it.5 Relatively few of America's large unions ever
3 V. R. Lorwin, The French Labor Movement 248 (1954).
4 Testimony of James B. Elkins before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Im-
proper Activities in the Labor or Management Field. The New York Times, March
1, 1957, p. 1.
5 The National Association of Manufacturers has declared organizational
picketing to be near the top of union practices which it would like most to have
made illegal, second only to its desire for Right to Work laws. The New York
Times, February 27, 1957, p. 18. See also, "Organizational Picketing in New
York State: An Indefensible Union Weapon which Must Be Restricted by Law"
an undated publication of the Commerce and Industry Association of New Yort,
Inc., which advocates an amendment to sec. 876-a of the New York Civil Practice
Act to redefine the phrase "labor dispute" so as to proscribe organizational
:picketing.
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use it, and, therefore, it does not have the universal support of
the trade union movement.
The state courts, on the balance, have not given their ap-
proval to organizational picketing, and, although hundreds of
such cases have been litigated during the past five years, they
have been decided with a veritable potpourri of legal reasoning.
Finding order and consistency in these cases is no easy
undertaking. They are complicated by constitutional problems,
state-federal jurisdictional problems and an extraordinary variety
of fact situations, all in addition to social policy considerations.
Organizational Picketing and Related Types of Picketing
Stranger Picketing. When a business is picketed by a trade
union which does not represent any of its employees, such
picketing is known in industrial literature as stranger picketing.
The union is a stranger to the particular business, although it
ordinarily will have members in the same industry. Stranger
picket lines may have many purposes.
Organizational Picketing. Stranger picketing which has for
its purpose persuasion of employees to join the union is known
as organizational picketing. It has the following distinguishing
characteristics: 1) it is conducted peacefully; 2) no demand for
recognition or for a contract has been made on the employer;
3) no other trade union has been chosen by the employees as
their collective bargaining representative; and 4) none or fewer
than a majority of the employees belong to the picketing union.
Violent and Mass Picketing. If there has been substantial
physical violence or verbal abuse on the picket line, it becomes a
violent picket line. If there are a great many pickets present so
that a traffic hazard is created, it becomes mass picketing.
Post-Certification Picketing. If another union has been al-
ready certified or chosen as bargaining agent for the employees
in a bona fide election, picketing of the employer's premises by a
stranger union is known as post-certification or rival picketing.
Recognition Picketing. If an express demand for recognition
or for a contract has been made on the employer, picketing by a
stranger union is thereafter known as recognition picketing.
1957]
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Summary of the Law
Under both state and federal law, it is perfectly clear that
violent picketing and mass picketing are unlawful. State courts
may enjoin violent or mass picketing even though the picketed
business is engaged in interstate commerce." Indeed, there is no
real dispute that such picketing should be enjoinable. There is,
however, some controversy as to what constitutes "violence" on
the picket line. Some state courts have found that a "black look"
from a picket is sufficient violence to justify an injunction. Other
courts reason that industrial disputes are not garden parties and
that a modicum of violence should not be the sole basis for an
injunction.
Under both federal law' and the law of most states,8 post-
certification or rival picketing is also unlawful and enjoinable.
Such picketing is viewed as immoral by responsible labor and
business spokesmen. Some controversy lingers regarding picket-
ing to protest the certification of a "company union" as bargaining
representative, but this is not a significant problem as a practical
matter. In terms of fundamental fairness, one union should not
attempt to interfere with the bargaining relationship of another
union which has been properly certified, and most unions adhere
to this doctrine scrupulously.
The grave controversy in contemporary labor law concerns
the legality of organizational and recognition picketing. They
differ only because the latter involves the making of an express
demand for recognition and for a contract on the employer,
whereas the former does not. Otherwise, their objective is the
same, i.e. to persuade the employees of the picketed business to join
the union. Under federal law, organizational and recognition pick-
eting are lawful, except in some secondary boycott cases involving
construction projects. Under state law, there is considerable dis-
agreement as to the legality of organizational picketing. Almost
all the states, however, are agreed that recognition picketing is
unlawful and enjoinable.
6 Allen-Bradley Local v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740 (1942); UAW v. WERB, 351
U.S. 266 (1956).
7 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. sec.
158(b) (4) (C).
8Independent Dairy Workers v. Teamsters, 127 A. 2d 869 (N.J. 1956);
Florshein Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union, 269 App. Div. 757,
54 N.Y.S. 2d 788 (1945).
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The Current Use of Organizational Picketing in
American Industry
According to figures compiled in 1955, seventeen to eighteen
million of America's sixty-five million gainfully employer persons
belong to trade unions.9 Most of these employees are in the major
manufacturing and processing industries. Left unorganized are
millions of smaller businesses, particularly in the retail sales and
retail services field.
Organizing workers in this field has been and plainly will be
no easy chore. Statistically, this field is growing both literally in
the number of persons employed and in terms of the percentage
of all gainfully employed persons.' 0 This growth is partly a con-
sequence of increased automation in the production and process-
ing fields.
Four main reasons explain why it is far more difficult to
organize these retail sales and service employees than it has been
to organize workers in the production field, and for these reasons
organizational picketing has proved itself an important organiz-
ing method.
First, because so many of these employees are "white collar"
workers, they normally associate themselves psychologically with
the managerial class, rather than with the working class. They
are, therefore, less inclined at the outset of an organizing cam-
paign to feel any identification with the trade union movement.
Second, many of these workers are employed by relatively
small businesses. To them the practice of collective bargaining
is somewhat less attractive than it is to production workers.
Especially is this true where their relations with their employers
are so personal as to make "individual bargaining" practicable."-
Third, it is probably true that many of the employers whose
businesses have not been unionized during the last twenty years
are openly and uncompromisingly hostile to trade unions. The
9 A. J. Goldberg, AFL-CIO: Labor United 220-221 (1956).10 In 1956, the number of employees engaged in all jobs, other than those
related to the production of goods, exceeded the 50% mark for the first time in
the nation's history. The New York Times, March 31, 1957, p. 1.
"1 A case in which a union tried to organize a self-employed embalmer and
engaged in organizational picketing to further that purpose is Metropolitan Funeral
Directors v. Zembrowski, 39 LRBIM 2202 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956). The decision
does not relate the message of the placard, but the appropriate choice would have
been: "Union Men-Dead or Alive-Do Not Patronize Non-Union Businesses."
1957
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employees of such "last hard core" employers might well fear the
consequences of joining a union in terms of invoking their em-
ployers' wrath. Indeed, their jobs may depend on their attitudes
towards unions. 2
Fourth, most businesses in this field are not engaged in inter-
state commerce, within the meaning of Section 2(6) of the Labor
Management Relations Act.13 State law, therefore, governs organ-
izing efforts in the retail sales and service field in the vast majority
of cases.
Because very few states have elaborate labor codes and ad-
ministrative agencies comparable to the federal Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Board,
with a few noticeable exceptions,' 4 the guarantees and opportuni-
ties to present the union's point of view-available under federal
law-are simply not available under the law of most of the states.
Other organizational methods, often far less desirable than those
available under federal law, have necessarily been developed.
Among these methods, organizational picketing is of preeminent
importance.
In the retail sales and service field, only a few unions have an
immediate interest in organizing. The three most important-and
most often involved in organizational picketing litigation-are the
Hotel and Restaurant Employees' and Bartenders' International
Union, the Retail Clerks International Association and the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America.
The few unions which use organizational picketing defend it
on the grounds that it is a necessary and peaceful means of
persuading workers of the benefits of trade unionism. Its critics
argue that it is primarily a weapon to put economic pressure on
an employer to compel him to coerce his employees to join the
union against their will. Between these two polar views of
12 Illustrative cases in which employees were summarily discharged without
legal recourse because of their union sympathies under state law are as follows:
Blue Boar v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 254 S.W. 2d 335 (Ky. 1952), and
Gilbertson v. Culinary Alliance, 204 Ore. 326, 282 P. 2d 632 (1955).
1361 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. sec. 152(6).
14 Although other states have labor relations agencies of various types and of
various statutory powers, the following states have laws which guarantee rights
comparable to those guaranteed under federal law: Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
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organizational picketing, the courts have found no single, satis-
factory ratio decidendi. The cases have predicated results on a
multitude of reasons, all of which have tried to resolve the ques-
tion of whether such picketing is merely persuasive of the desir-
ability of union membership or economically coercive of the
employer and his employees.
An examination of the state court decisions governing organi-
zational picketing and its related types reveals substantial dis-
parity in the thinking (and non-thinking) of the courts.
Organizational Picketing and State Law
That organizational and recognition picketing constitute one
of the most controversial problems in contemporary labor law is
demonstrated by the fact that some twenty seven states have
litigated such cases in their appellate courts during the past five
years. The period 1953-1957 is significant because during this
time the states have reconsidered their picketing decisions in
the wake of the Supreme Court's changing views of the require-
ments of the First and Fourteenth Amendments regarding picket-
ing. Moreover, this has also been a period of unprecedented
efforts by unions to organize the retail sales and services field.
The law of the states cannot be characterized with ease, be-
cause varying fact situations have evoked different judicial re-
sponses. There are, nevertheless, some few clear patterns among
the state cases.
Generally the remedy sought in these cases has been the
extraordinary, equitable writ of injunction. Damages have been
sought in only a few cases by the picketed employer. In one
unique case, a Michigan court awarded damages to an employee
against a union, because he was discharged by his employer in
the face of the union's bare threat to establish an organizational
picket line.15 This case, however, is unprecedented.
Since 1953, only one state high court has refused to enjoin
organizational picketing principally on the ground that the federal
constitution prohibits such result.'- This case, however, is clearly
out of the main stream of the state decisions, and it is based on a
15 Edwards v. Carpenters, 64 N.W. 2d 715 (Mich. 1954).
16 Pueblo Building Trades Council v. Harper Construction Co., 807 P. 2d
468 (Colo. 1957).
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very doubtful reading of the Supreme Court's recent picketing
decisions.
Several state courts have reasoned that their anti-injunction
statutes per se prohibit enjoining such picketing.1 7 These anti-
injunction statutes generally bar injunctions where there is a
"labor dispute," and the courts of some of the states have found a
'labor dispute" when a stranger union pickets for organizational
purposes. These courts, therefore, had no reason to pursue the
social and economic considerations of organizational picketing.
Although the cases and treatises talk of the distinction be-
tween organizational and recognition picketing, a survey of all
the state decisions during the past five years definitively reveals
that the distinction is not reflected in the courts' holdings. Pro-
fessor Archibald Cox of the Harvard Law School has termed it a
"silly judicial distinction."18 Another writer has suggested that
the "distinction has arisen largely by way of rationalization by
judges of their opinions; when they wish to enjoin picketing it is
labeled 'recognition'; when they feel it should not be enjoined
it becomes 'organizational."" 9
Of the states which have concluded decisionally that organi-
zational picketing is lawful as a method of persuading non-union
employees to join the union, only New York appears to recognize
the distinction between picketing in which demands are made on
the employer expressly and in which no demands are made on
the employer. Only the latter, organizational picketing, is lawful
in New York, under the well known decision in Wood v.
O'Grady.20 This result has been so distressing to New York em-
ployers that they have tried several times to amend Section 876-a
of the New York Civil Practice Act to make organizational
picketing unlawful by statute. These efforts have been unsuccess-
ful, however, for the New York legislature in the spring of 1957
refused for the fourth time to enact such legislation.
An intermediate court in Illinois has indicated its approval of
the distinction, holding picketing lawful specifically because no
17 Pomonis v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 56 N.M. 56, 239 P. 2d 1003
(1952); Lindsey Tavern v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 125 A. 2d 207 (R.I.
1956).
3.8A. Cox, "Some Current Problems in Labor Law," 35 LRRM 48, 57 (1954).
'9 S. C. Vladeck, 8 N.Y.U. Conference on Labor 207 (1955).
.20 307 N.Y. 532, 122 N.E. 2d 886 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 939 (1955).
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demands had been made on the employer.21 The Supreme Court
of Illinois has not yet approved the distinction, however.
Pennsylvania courts permit peaceful picketing-whether organ-
izational or recognition-without giving attention to the distinc-
tion that a demand on the employer has been made.22 The Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania, however, looks to the duration of
the picketing. In one case, it held that, after five years of con-
tinual picketing, the purpose could no longer be organizational,
for during this period the union had been unsuccessful in per-
suading a majority of the employees to join. An injunction, there-
fore, was allowed.23 It reached the same conclusion when recog-
nition picketing had been conducted unsuccessfully for a three
year period.24
In three recent cases, courts have recognized the right to
picket for organizational purposes when the unions argued prin-
cipally that they were protesting substandard wages, and when
they demonstrated with clear evidence that the competitive wage
differential was substantial. 5 Most state courts, however, have
ignored this aspect of organizational picketing, perhaps because
the unions failed to emphasize it.
Several courts have looked specifically to the question of
whether the union, in addition to picketing, had made any other
efforts to organize the employees. Finding none, they concluded
that the absence of such other efforts indicated that the union
was not sincerely interested in persuading the employees, but
solely with coercing the employer to compel his employees to
join the union.2 These cases are few, however.
Fifteen state courts, most of them appellate courts, have
decided during the past five years that picketing by a stranger
21 Simmons v. Retail Clerks, 125 N.E. 2d 700 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955).
22 E.g., Amore v. Building and Trades Council, 39 LRRM 2152 (Pa. Ct. Com.
P1. 1956).23 Anchorage v. Waiters and Waitresses, 383 Pa. 577, 119 A. 2d 199 (1956).
24 Sansom House v. Waiters and Waitresses, 382 Pa. 476, 115 A. 2d 746
(1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 896 (1955).
25 Self v. Wisener, 287 S.W. 2d 890 (Ark. 1956); Pueblo Building Trades
Council v. Harper Construction Co., 307 P. 2d 468 (Colo. 1957); and Slosberg v.
Money, 33 LRRM 2256 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1953).2a Teamsters v. Merchandise Warehouse Co., 132 N.E. 2d 715 (Ind. App. Ct.
1956); Way Baking Co. v. Teamsters, 335 Mich. 478, 56 N.W. 2d 357 (1953),
cert. denied 345 U.S. 957; Postma Gravel Co. v. Teamsters, 334 Mich. 347, 54
N.W. 2d 681 (1952), cert. denied 345 U.S. 922; Tallman Co. v. Teamsters, 284
S.W. 2d 547 (Mo. 1955); Bellerive Country Club v. Hotel and Restaurant Em-
ployees, 284 S.W. 2d 492 (Mo. 1955).
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union is violative of their statutory policies favoring employees'
free choice in the selection of a collective bargaining agent.
2 7
In none of these did the court or the employer demand a secret
ballot to determine the employees' true choice, but in most of
these cases the employer requested his employees to testify in
open court to the conclusion that they did not favor the picketing
union.
These courts all reasoned implicitly or explicitly that picketing
by a union which does not represent a majority of the employees
is "coercive of the employer to coerce his employees to join the
union." This very phrase has been repeated innumerable times
in these decisions. Although these cases sometimes refer to the
fact that a demand for recognition or for a contract was made on
the employer, this seems in most cases to have been merely an
evidentiary hook on which to rest their decisions, for there were
no dicta which might reasonably be interpreted to mean that the
absence of such demands would have produced a different result.
Indeed, many of the courts expressly stated their disbelief in the
validity of the distinction between organizational and recognition
picketing.
Most of these courts cloaked their decisions in the rationale
that, because the employer was financially injured during the
course of the picketing, the only purpose of the picketing was to
coerce him to compel his employees to join the union. And, be-
cause their state policies favored employees' free choice, they
concluded in good syllogistic form that the picketing was unlaw-
ful and enjoinable. Beyond this primitive logic, these courts have
not explored the economic interests which the union has in solicit-
ing employees' memberships through the picketing route. These
27 Kenmike Theatre v. Motion Picture Operators, 139 Conn. 95, 90 A. 2d 881
(1952); Fountainebleau Hotel v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 92 So. 2d 415
(Fla. 1957); Powers v. Hod Carriers, 96 S.E. 2d 577 (Ga. 1957); Newberry Co.
v. Retail Clerks, 298 P. 2d 375 (Idaho 1956); Blue Boar v. Hotel and Restaurant
Employees, 254 S.W. 2d 355 (Ky. 1952); Pappas v. Hotel and Restaurant Em-
ployees, 151 Me. 36, 116 A. 2d 497 (1955); Olen Department Stores v. Retail
Clerks, 39 LRRM 2112 (Miss. Chan. Ct. 1956); American Hotel Co. v. Bar-
tenders' International, 297 S.W. 2d 411 (Mo. 1957); Chucales v. Royalty, 164
Ohio St. 214, 129 N.E. 2d 823 (1955); Gilbertson v. Culinary Alliance, 204 Ore.
326, 282 P. 2d 632 (1955); Electrical Workers v. O'Brien, 40 LRRM 2196 (Tenn.
Sup. Ct. 1957); Audubon Homes v. Spokane Building Council, 149 Wash. Dec.
144, 298 P. 2d 1112 (1956); Vogt v. Teamsters, 270 Wis. 315, 74 N.W. 2d 749
(1956); Hagen v. Culinary Alliance, 70 Wyo. 165, 246 P. 2d 778 (1952); and
Sutton v. Marvidikds, 40 LRRM 2232 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1957).
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courts accept an unspoken assumption that the employer's eco-
nomic interests are paramount to the union's.
Only one court, the Supreme Court of Florida, in a startlingly
innocent statement, revealed that it disapproves of any picketing,
unless a majority of the employees aheady belong to the picketing
union. This is undoubtedly the attitude of most of the state
courts, but only the Florida court has flirted with this notion so
openly. In Sax Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotel and Restaurant Em-
ployees, 8 arising out of the famous Miami Beach hotel strikes,
the Florida Supreme Court stated its views explicitly:
Without doubt, a labor organization has the right
to engage in peaceful picketing on the employer's premises
when predicated on the refusal of the employer to recognize
and negotiate with the union as the representative of such
employer's employees. In order for such picketing to be
lawful, the union must establish that the employees have
chosen it as their representative ...
It is this writer's opinion that the courts of the states have
dealt with organizational picketing too summarily. Moreover, at
best, the rationale that such picketing is "coercive of the em-
ployer to coerce his employees" is a superficial and unsatisfactory
one.
The organizational picket line is a far more complex institu-
tion than the state courts which so easily enjoin it have recog-
nized. Because it is not now likely that organizational picketing
is constitutionally protected as free expression under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U. S. Constitution, 9 the fol-
lowing analysis proceeds on the assumption that there is no gen-
eral constitutional immunity for such picketing and that public
policy considerations alone govern.
As part of a trade union's campaign to organize the employees
of a business, the organizational picket line may influence the be-
havior of four economically distinct groups: 1) the employees
whom the union desires to organize; 2) their employer; 3) the
general, consuming public, including union and non-union con-
sumers; and 4) the Teamsters who deal with the picketed em-
ployer.
28 80 So. 2d 602, 603 (Fla. 1955).
29 The constitutional aspects of organizational picketing are discussed at p.
53, infra.
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Each of these groups may be affected quite differently by the
picket line. In exploring the social and economic utility of organi-
zational picketing, the impact on these groups must be carefully
examined.
The Impact of Organizational Picketing on Employees
It is the declared public policy of the United States ° and of
all the states3 that employees should be free to select agents of
their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. This is
a right without meaning unless trade unions are able to com-
municate with unorganized workers to explain the benefits of
membership. Unions argue, therefore, that a grave injustice is
done them when they are deprived of the right to communicate
to other workers by way of the picket line.
Historically, the denial of free communication to workers has
resulted in great social disorder. After the general strike and
workers' rebellion in Russia in 1905, when the Czarist govern-
ment reneged on its promises to allow workers to organize freely,
Leon Trotsky wrote dramatically that "to the workers the free
word is bread and air."32 Perhaps it is a fair generalization of
Western political history that, when a society imposes undue
restrictions on the right of expression, the price of such restric-
tions ultimately proves to be far dearer than allowing the ex-
pression. How important, therefore, is the organizational picket
line for purposes of communicating the message of trade union-
ism?
As a means of carrying their message, the unions insist that the
picket line is vital, not merely desirable. To be sure, there are
other media of communication, but the picket line in America
has become the most important symbol of the organized move-
ment. Many other types of persuasion have been employed in
American industrial history, including religious exhortations,
33
3 0 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. see. 151,
et seq.31 Either by statute, e.g., Kentucky Revised Statutes 336.130(1), or by state
constitutions, e.g., 1945 Constitution of Missouri, Article 1, Section 29.
32 Russkaya Gazeta, November 17, 1950, cited in I. Deutscher, The Prophet
Armed 139.
-3 An unusual case in which prayers were substituted for pickets at the em-
ployer's gates is related in E. T. Hiller, The Strike, 110-121.
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but the picket line alone has emerged as the universally under-
stood symbol of labor's cause.
Employers, however, argue that organizational picketing is
not a mere symbol and medium of communication but that it is a
device to coerce the employer and his employees. Professor
Sylvester Petro of the Law School of New York University is the
most prolific and persistent critic of organizational picketing. He
states his position unequivocally:
[Organizational] picketing is designed to disrupt
and disorganize business to the point where both the em-
ployer and employees, who would otherwise resist the
unions, give in simply in order to continue their work-not
because they wish to deal with or through the union.34
His thesis, accepted by most of the state courts, is that
organizational picketing is designed to put so much economic
pressure on the employer that, despite the wishes of his em-
ployees, he will compel them to join the union rather than endure
injury to his profits. Professor Petro and the state courts do not,
by this reasoning, credit employers either with self-restraint or
nobility of purpose.
Without pausing at this point to examine the "coercion" con-
cept in greater detail, it is plain that Professor Petro's logic is not
wholly sound, for he ignores those cases in which the organiza-
tional picket line was so situated that only the employees could
see it and be influenced by it, and where neither the general con-
suming public nor the Teamsters could see it.35
Unions retort further that organizational picketing has the
practical advantage that it may be seen and read by a number of
people simultaneously, which is of substantial importance in com-
municating to workers as they enter and leave their employer's
premises at the same time.
Critics of organizational picketing, however, argue that unions
ought to use other media which are directed only to the em-
ployees and which will not cause economic injury to the employer.
Unions retort again that the suggested, alternative media are
either ineffective, too expensive or in some instances totally un-
34 S. Petro, "Free Speech and Organizational Picketing in 1952;' 4 Lab. LJ.
3,4 (1953).
35 Douds v. Bakery Workers, 224 F. 2d 49 (2d Cir. 1955); Porrata v. Gross,
38 LRRM 2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956).
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available to them for organizing purposes. Small unions argue
this point persuasively.
Discussing the constitutional aspects of organizational picket-
ing, Professor Morris Forkosch of Brooklyn Law School makes
the following observations about the inadequacy of alternative
media for small, independent unions:
Numerous alternatives [to organizational picket-
ing] are found, for example, newspaper advertising, radio
and television, but if a small group seeks to obtain votes,
where can it get the funds? The real question is not whether
any alternative exists, but whether an effective and available
alternative is found. For example, even if financially avail-
able, a newspaper may be published outside the locality in-
volved and not be read by many of the workers, so that it is
not an effective alternative to disseminating information at
the plant. ... Picketing, therefore, may be the very life-
blood of a small group of workers, and the Constitution
must protect them if the law denies them all other effective
means of obtaining bargaining status.
30
It is a curious irony that employers' associations, which ordi-
narily champion the rights of independent, local unions against
wealthier, national unions, would deny to small unions the
medium of communication best suited to their organizational
needs.
However, even wealthier, national unions cannot always use
other media effectively. It is self-evident that metropolitan daily
newspapers, radio and television are too expensive and imprac-
tical to reach the employees of small businesses. Moreover, in
some small, anti-union Southern communities, access to these
media-totally aside from questions of cost-has been categorically
denied to unions.
3 7
Professor Petro has generalized that "there is no state in the
Union which has not, in one form or another, accepted whole-
heartedly the right of employees to form and join unions of their
choosing."38 Therefore, he concludes, there is no "rational ground
36 M. Forkoseh, "Informational, Representational and Organizational Picket-
ing," 6 Lab. L.J. 843, 861 (1955).37 See "All Rights Denied," by the Textile Workers Union of America (1955),
which describes an organizational campaign in Elkin, N.C., in which the union
was denied the right to use any of the media of communication in the town.
38 S. Petro, "Free Speech and Organizational Picketing in 1952," 4 Lab. L.J.
4, 8 (1953).
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for challenging the general reasonableness of a state policy which
would condemn coercive types of organizational activities by
unions," i.e. organizational picketing. Although all states have
adopted statutory policies purporting to favor collective bargain-
ing and the right of employees' self-organization, most of these
statues are mere policy declarations, providing no substantive
legal rights and duties.39 It is unfortunate that the most out-
spoken critics of organizational picketing in the legal journals
write with specific reference to the statutes and cases of their own
states, most of which are industrially advanced and which do
provide elaborate protections to workers in the exercise of their
right to organize. 40
Some courts, failing to realize that Professor Petro's analysis is
predicated largely on New York labor relations law, which is
highly developed, have specifically relied on his logic, even
though their own states offered none of the protections guaran-
teed to workers by the law of New York. The Kentucky Court
of Appeals is one such court.4
Under federal law a reasonable right to communicate to other
workers has been clearly and positively guaranteed, as an indis-
pensable feature of the right of self-organization. 2 Aside from
the few exceptional and highly industrialized states, the right
of unions to communicate to workers is not guaranteed by the
law of the states in any significant sense.
Moreover, because a worker may be discharged summarily
by his employer in most states if he attempts to organize his
fellow employees, the burden of organizing falls necessarily on
outside unions, which are free of the employer's immediate eco-
nomic power.
39Sandt v. Mason, 208 Ga. 541, 67 S.E. 2d 767 (1951); and Quinn v.
Buchanan, 298 S.W. 2d 413 (Mo. 1957).40 Professor Petro writes primarily of the law of New York, which has both
a well established labor code and a vigorous administrative board to implement it.
Mr. David L. Brenetar, another critical writer on organizational picketing, is also a
member of the New York bar. Mr. I. Herbert Rothenberg, whose views are much
akin to Mr. Petro's, is a member of the Pennsylvania bar.
41 The following cases specifically cite Professor Petro's articles with approval
and quote from them: Blue Boar v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 254 S.W. 2d
335 (Ky. 1952); Gilbertson v. Culinary Alliance, 204 Ore. 326, 282 P. 2d 632
(1955); and Audubon Homes v. Spokane Building Council, 149 Wash. Dec. 144,
298 P. 2d 1112 (1956).
42 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. sec.
157 and 158(a).
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Most states offer unions no right to enter the premises of the
employer to urge union membership. In order to reach the em-
ployees' ears at all, therefore, unions must wait outside the em-
ployer's door to communicate their messages. When radio, news-
paper and television media are either too expensive, ineffective
or unavailable to unions dealing with small businesses, the picket
placard is resorted to as the suitable and effective means of com-
munication. Certainly unions can spread their messages by word
of mouth in many cases. In other cases, however, the number of
employees may be too large or the employees may fear invoking
their employer's disfavor by being seen talking to union organ-
izers. Denial of the right to picket in such cases is a significant
barrier to the right of self-organization.
In terms of its specific impact on employees, the organizational
picket line may be persuasive in several respects: 1) it points out
to workers that joining a union means positive benefits eco-
nomically; 2) it appeals to the employees' social consciousness
through the suggestion that, by accepting substandard wages,
they endanger the standards of other workers throughout the
same industry; and 3) it suggests to them that by joining the
organized labor movement they need not fear their employer's
economic power.
Through the picket line, the employees who see its message
may be made conscious that their wages and conditions are sub-
standard, if such is the fact. Typical appeals are made with
placards which bear legends such as this: "Workers Organize for
Security-Better Wages-Hours and Conditions." Although such
a message itself can hardly be convincing, it may be a timely and
pointed reminder of the advantages of union membership, which
in the long run may be a weighty factor in that complex of psy-
chological and economic influences which causes workers to join
a union. This is the "conscious self-advantage" purpose of
organizational picketing.
Second, the picket line, by the very physical presence of the
pickets, suggests to employees that in some respects their employ-
ment relationship is adversely different from that of unionized
employees in the same industry. Where the union particularly
urges on them that their wages are "substandard" (meaning
below the union scale), they might be struck by the obvious eco-
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nomic fact that low wages drive out high wages and that ac-
cepting non-union wages and conditions tends to injure union-
ized, fellow workers in the same industry. This is the "social
consciousness" purpose of organizational picketing.
In Exchange Bakery and Restaurant v. Waiters and Waitresses,
Local 1,43 one of the earliest organizational picketing cases, the
New York Court of Appeals stated the rationale for organizational
picketing in terms of wage competition in the same industry and
in terms of workers' unity of interest:
The purpose of a labor union to improve the con-
ditions under which its members work; to increase their
wages; to assist them in other ways may justify what would
otherwise be a wrong. So would an effort to increase its
numbers and to unionize an entire trade or business. It may
be as interested in the wages of those not members, or in
the conditions under which they work as in their own mem-
bers, because of the influence of one upon the other. All by
the principle of collective bargaining. Economic organiza-
tion today is not based on the single shop.
Demonstrative of the fact that organizational picketing is
often conducted to protect the prevailing wage and other stand-
ards of a union, rather than for mere purposes of membership
aggrandizement, are the cases in which the unions indicated their
willingness to withdraw the picket line if wages were raised,
making no demands whatsoever that the employees should join."
Finally, the presence of the organizational picket line-unlike
any other media of communication-can demonstrate to em-
ployees that, by joining the union, they need not fear their em-
ployer's economic power. This factor is important, perhaps above
all others. Professor Cox has stated this rationale of the organi-
zational picket line as follows:
Concerted activities which demonstrate the power
of the union may be an important part of the electioneering
not so much because of economic coercion but because the
publicity and demonstration of the union's power go far to
offset hitherto unorganized employees' fear of running
counter to the employer's wishes, a fear kept alive and
strengthened by the artful use of his freedom of expression.
43245 N.Y. 260, 263 (1927).44 Self v. Wisener, 287 S.W. 2d 890 (Ark. 1956); and Slosberg v. Money, 33
LRRM 2256 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1953).
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In other words, the expression of opinion [by employees]
which follows a campaign in which unions are free to picket
may be more reliable than a poll without competing
pressures.
45
Although Professor Cox's context was that of an election
under federal law, his logic would seem applicable a fortiori to
organizing campaigns and elections under state law.
The Impact of Organizational Picketing on Employers
In their public utterances on the subject of organizational
picketing, employers' associations state solicitude for the "right
of employees freely to choose their bargaining agents."4  This
solicitude, out of character with the traditional attitude of busi-
ness groups towards trade unions, suggests that it may be lost
profits, not alone concern for employees' wishes, which provokes
employers' resentment of organizational picketing.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, many state courts have been
persuaded to enjoin picketing for organizational purposes on the
sole theory that it has the effect of "coercing the employer to
coerce his employees" to join the union.
If a demand of any sort has been made on the employer,
most state courts grasp at the notion that the picketing is overtly
designed to compel the employer to recognize the union, which
these courts hold violative of their public policies.
47
Some courts, faced with situations of organizational picketing
in which no demands had been made on the employer, have
reasoned that the picketing constituted an implied demand for
45 A. Cox, "Some Current Problems in Labor Law," 35 LRRM 48, 56 (1954).
46 R. Abelow, "Statement of the Commerce and Industry Association of New
York, Inc., Regarding Organizational Picketing," (1954) before the New York
State Joint Legislative Committee on Industrial and Labor Conditions.
47 Klibanoff v. Retail Clerks, 258 Ala. 479, 64 So. 2d 673 (1953); Burgess v.
Daniel Plumbing Co., 285 S.W. 2d 517 (Ark. 1956); Kenmike Theatre v. Motion
Picture Operators, 139 Conn. 95, 90 A. 2d 881 (1952); Sax Enterprises v. Hotel
and Restaurant Employees, 80 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1954); Powers v. Hod Carriers, 96
S.E. 2d 577 (Ga. 1957); Blue Boar v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 254 S.W.
2d 335 (Ky. 1952); Postma Gravel Co. v. Teamsters, 334 Mich. 347, 54 N.W. 2d
681 (1952); Olen Department Stores v. Retail Clerks, 39 LRRM 2112 (Miss.
Chan. Ct. 1956); American Hotel Co. v. Bartenders' International, 297 S.W. 2d
411 (Mo. 1957); Chucales v. Royalty, 164 Ohio St. 214, 129 N.E. 2d 823 (1955);
Gilbertson v. Culinary Alliance, 204 Ore. 326, 282 P. 2d 632 (1955); Thurman v.
Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 37 LRRM 2579 (Tenn. Chan. Ct. 1956);
Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953); and Hagen v. Culinary Alliance, 70
Wyo. 165, 246 P. 2d 778 (1952).
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recognition, which therein was held to be unlawful.48 Indeed,
finding no other basis to grant an injunction, the Supreme Court
of Idaho enjoined organizational picketing in one case because
the union failed to make a contract demand on the employerd49
Only a few state courts, as discussed above, have held that
unions may lawfully organize by way of the picket line. These
few courts, which recognized that the employer might be finan-
cially injured, reasoned that such injuries are merely incidental
to the risk of conducting a business in the Mid-Twentieth Century
and are damnum absque injuria.5°
In the wake of an overwhelmingly hostile attitude of the state
courts towards organizational picketing, and their concern to pro-
tect the employer from being influenced to coerce his employees
against their wishes, one would logically assume that in these
cases the employees had expressed their desire not to join the
picketing union. In such cases, if expression of their choice was
a free and genuine one, there could be little point in allowing the
union to continue picketing. Although the state courts always
assume the employees' choice in these cases is against the union,
this assumption-in the light of contemporary knowledge of labor
relations-is often extraordinarily doubtful.
There are two fundamental inconsistencies in the reasoning
of almost all the cases which enjoin picketing because it is said
that it is designed to coerce the employer to coerce his employees
to join the union: 1) most of these courts do not enjoin employers
from coercing their employees directly to join the union;81 there-
fore, such courts enjoin a union from influencing the employer
when they would not enjoin an employer from doing the same
acts on his own initiative; and 2) in most of these cases the em-
4 8 Teamsters v. Merchandise Warehouse Co., 132 N.E. 2d 715 (Ind. App. Ct.
1956); Pappas v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 151 Me. 36, 116 A. 2d 497
(1955); Way Baking Co. v. Teamsters, 335 Mich. 478, 56 N.W. 2d 357 (1953);
Audubon Homes v. Spokane Building Council, 149 Wash. Dec. 144, 298 P. 2d
1112 (1956); and Vogt v. Teamsters, 270 Wis. 315, 74 N.W. 2d 749 (1956).49 Newberry Co. v. Retail Clerks, 298 P. 2d 375 (Idaho 1956); c.f. Fountaine-
bleau Hotel v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 92 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1957).
50 Skinner v. Carpenters, 36 LRRM 2468 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1955); Simmons v.
Retail Clerks, 125 N.E. 2d 700 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955); Wood v. O'Grady, 307 N.Y.
532, 122 N.E. 2d 386 (1954); Amore v. Building and Trades Council, 39 LRRM
2152 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1956); and Anchorage v. Waiters and Waitresses Union,
383 Pa. 547, 119 A. 2d 199 (1955) (Dictum)51 E.g., Sandt v. Mason, 208 Ga. 541, 67 S.E. 2d 767 (1951); Quinn v.
Buchanan, 298 S.W. 2d 413 (Mo. 1957).
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ployer did not even request that his employees be given a secret
ballot to determine whether they really desired to be represented
by the picketing union; even more alarming, not one of the state
high courts required that a secret vote be conducted before
enjoining the picketing.
Professor Petro, the employer's champion, has stated the posi-
tion of the majority of the state courts as follows:
Where a union pickets in order to organize the
employees, there is nothing the employer can lawfully do to
extricate himself from the harm he is suffering. Organiza-
tional picketing implies a dispute, not between the union
and the employer but between the union and the unorgan-
ized employees; if the employees would join, the dispute
would end. The employer would violate the law if he in-
duced the employees to join. Yet the harm done by the
organizational picketing is done primarily to the em-
ployer.5 2
In most of the states in which organizational picketing has
been enjoined on the basis of this logic, the employer would
violate no 'law," if he interceded in his employees' choice,
whether for or against the union. At most, he would violate a
"declared public policy." The declared public policy of a state
that employees shall be free to select the bargaining agent of
their choice generally has only two legal effects: to make "yellow
dog" contracts invalid and to legalize the right to strike. Such
policies simply do not impose any sanctions of law on the em-
ployer if he coerces or discharges his employees for pro-union
activities. The logic of most of these cases, therefore, at best
seems fundamentally unsound and unfair.
Professor Petro's logic seems faulty again when he asserts
that there is nothing the employer can do to extricate himself
from the position of middle man in an organizing campaign in
which picketing is used. He may lawfully, in most states under
state law, coerce his employees to join the union, without any
possible legal consequences to himself. More morally, however,
the employer could demand that the union agree to a secret bal-
lot election in which his employees could make their choice, free
from pressure of the union or himself. After such an election, if
5
2 S. Petro, "Recognition and Organizational Picketing in 1952," 3 Lab. L.J.
819, 821 (1953).
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the employees by their ballots have decided to have no dealings
with the union, the employer- in good faith-could move to en-
join the picketing. This is the rational approach which essentially
is required by federal law.53
Why employers in organizational picketing cases have not
demanded secret ballot elections does not appear in the opinions
of the state courts. However, that such a secret ballot election
did not suggest itself to employers raises the negative inference
that they were indifferent to their employees' choice and that
they were determined to defeat the union despite their employees'
choice.54
Would it be unreasonable judicial legislation for the courts
of equity to require a secret ballot election before enjoining
organizational picketing? Such an election would certainly ef-
fectuate more truly the declared policies of the states. A court
should not be satisfied with the employer's bare assertion that
the picketing union does not represent a majority of his em-
ployees. Neither should a petition solicited by the employer from
his employees be satisfactory either, for the employer's power in
such cases is too blatant. A secret ballot election, conducted by
an independent agency or by a commissioner of the court, seems
the only fair prerequisite for an injunction in such cases.
The rationale that organizational picketing is "coercive" is
too often just a matter of words, not logic. Professor Edgar
Jones, in an analysis of the "coercion" concept in picketing cases,
concludes that coercion is primarily a judicial epithet, not a sub-
stantive, economic reality. In response to the judicial assertion
that financial injury to the employer "coerces" him, Professor
Jones makes this reply:
It is true enough that the businessman has an acute
ache in the region of his cash register when the picket suc-
ceeds. But that ache is chronic. He gets it when he has to
lower his prices or watch customers go to competitors. He
gets it when his landlord demands an increase in rent and
he must choose between moving elsewhere or paying the
53 Federal law on this point is discussed at p. 60, infra.
54 Thomas Jefferson, Inc. v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 84 So. 2d 583
(Fla. 1956). In this case, the trial court appointed a commissioner to conduct an
election among the employees, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed, reasoning
that this procedure exceeded the trial court's powers and also that it denied the
employer the right of cross-examination and confrontation.
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higher rent. He gets it when his wholesaler notifies him of
an increase in price and he knows his local market will not
permit him to pass the price increase on to his customers....
The result may indeed appear to be harsh for the in-
dividual business concern which is subjected to the societal
pressure stimulated by peacefully conducted picketing. But
the same pressure, raised by other stimuli, is present so fre-
quently in our industrial society as hardly to be thought
novel, however one may philosophize about the morality
of a society which willingly encourages it. ... It is enough
to recognize that the pressure brought to bear on him is not
coercion but is instead a societal pressure to be seen in
operation under countless circumstances every day. It exists
as a norm of our society because we believe it is wiser to let
public opinion shift about as it will and be subject to the
sway of reason or the emotion of the special pleader who
seeks to advance his cause by gaining the support of public
opinion.55
If the employer is injured financially in the course of a union's
organizational campaign involving picketing, he should not have
to be subjected to it indefinitely.
Secret ballot elections would serve to reflect the true wishes
of the employees and also as a cut-off period for the picketing.
To be sure, if the employees choose the picketing union as their
bargaining representative in a fairly conducted election, and the
employer refuses thereafter to bargain with the union, the picket-
ing should not be enjoined. If, however, the union has had a
reasonable time in which to organize the employees through the
use of the picket line, and the employees decide that they do not
desire to be represented by that union, picketing for organiza-
tional purposes thereafter should be enjoined.
In a free society, the employer's loss of profits ought not to be
the sole criterion of the legality of union activity.
The Impact of Organizational Picketing on the General Public
In addition to its impact on the employees and the employer,
organizational picketing may also have effect on individual third
parties who see the picket placards. This group may be divided
into three principal subgroups: 1) the non-union consuming
55 E. Jones, "Picketing and Coercion: A Jurisprudence of Epithets," 39 Va.
L.R. 1023 (1953).
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public; 2) the union consuming public; and 3) the Teamsters in
the course of their employment.
So far as the general, non-union consuming public is con-
cerned, the organizational picket line may or may not induce
abstention from dealing with the picketed business. Some in-
dividual members of this group may be persuaded on the basis
of whether it ig a strike line or a stranger picket line. Although
there undoubtedly are members of the general public who, as a
matter of principle, will cross n6 picket lines, there are far more
who are totally indifferent to picket lines and who cross them
regardless of their purpose, even gleefully.
There is little likelihood in this third quarter of the Twentieth
Century that many people fear to cross stranger picket lines be-
fore retail stores because of anticipated harm to themselves. Of
the tremendous number of picketing cases decided each year by
the state courts, only an infinitesimal number involve any phy-
sical violence. The courts have no reluctance to enjoin picketing
on the slightest showing of violence. Indeed, the Supreme Court
of Florida has practically enjoined the "black look."56
As to members of the non-union consuming public, therefore,
the organizational picket line is purely persuasive, not coercive.
More disputed is the impact of the organizational picket line
on the union consuming public. Because most organizational
picketing cases involve retail sales and service businesses, union
members of the consuming public-if they refuse to cross such
lines-might cause losses to the picketed employer. Indeed, part
of the purpose of the organizational picket line is to persuade the
public not to deal with the employer on the theory that such a
demonstration of union solidarity and strength will persuade em-
ployees that they have much economic strength to gain by joining
the picketing union.
The critics of organizational picketing, however, assert that
picketing per se involves a blind obedience from union members
of the consuming public. Perhaps this position is best stated by
I. H. Rothenberg as follows:
Anyone who has ever interested himself in the his-
tory, operations and tactics of labor unions is fully aware
56 Fountainebleau Hotel v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 92 So. 2d 415
(Fla. 1957).
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that at the very base of the labor movement, and forming
its tissue and marrow, is the injunction: 'Do not cross a
picket line.' Without this basic rule and practice of union-
ism, the entire movement would collapse. It is on this key-
stone of keeping picket lines inviolate that the whole theory
of reciprocal unionist [sic.] is founded. ....
Even if some individual characteristics were patent to
the disinterested observer, there is nothing in the dogma
which exempts the 'organizationa picket line, any more
than any other variety, from the basic injunction to union-
ists against crossing picket lines.57
Although most students of labor relations would doubt Mr.
Rothenberg's assertion that the trade union movement would go
up in smoke if the right to picket were totally denied, it is clearly
true that union members are urged to respect picket lines, as a
matter of principle. But there are union members and union
members! Obviously all union members are not zealous about
or even fond of the labor movement. Union members cannot be
penalized by the union if they refuse to respect a picket line under
federal law."' Under the law of most states there is nothing which
prohibits penalizing a member who crosses a picket line in viola-
tion of his union's recommendation. However, as a practical mat-
ter, and there is nothing in the cases which points to the con-
trary, most unions simply are too indifferent to the organizational
picket lines of other unions to make particular efforts to exhort
their members to respect them. This is true because organiza-
tional picket lines are usually used with small, retail businesses.
For constitutional purposes, Professor Cox suggests that a
sharp distinction be drawn between such a picket line, which he
characterizes as a "publicity" picket line, and the so-called "signal"
picket line:
Quite different [from signal picketing] is the
peaceful picketing which is directed primarily to the general
public. Familiar illustrations may be found outside motion
picture theatres, restaurants and beauty parlors where none
of the employees are on strike. Theoretically such a picket
line is entitled to the same respect from union members as
any other picket line, but as a practical matter the same
economic sanctions play little part."
57 I. H. Rothenberg, "Organizational Picketing," 5 Lab. L.J. 689, 693 (1954).
58 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. sec.
158(a) (3) and sec. 158(b) (2).
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If a union member in the course of his employment refuses to
cross the picket line of another union, he may be discharged by
his employer under federal law,60 as well as under the law of the
states. Moreover, if the union member cannot reach his job be-
cause of the presence of a picket line of another union which he
chooses not to cross, he will be denied unemployment compensa-
tion benefits by those few states which have decided this issue.01
Therefore, as to both the non-union and the union consuming
public, the impact of organizational picketing seems to be pri-
marily persuasive, not coercive.
Organizational Picketing and the Teamsters
All industries have important contacts with truck transporta-
tion, and some are vitally dependent on trucking services. It is a
modem industrial truism that the economic impact of picket lines
in many industries will vary in direct proportion to the degree of
respect accorded them by the million and a half member Team-
sters' union. 2
In the retail field, the power of the Teamsters is great. Goods
to be sold must be delivered to the retail seller; when sold, such
goods must often be delivered to the buyer. When such deliveries
can be made efficiently only by the trucks of independent car-
riers, the power of the Teamsters is greatest.63 The relationship
of the Teamsters to the organizational and other picket lines,
therefore, deserves close examination.
Fully aware of the magnitude of their power, the Teamsters
sometimes confess that they exercise this power according to the
Gompers' notion of expediency, i.e. to help their friends and to
50 A. Cox, "Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution," 4 Vand. L.R. 574, 594
(1951).
CU N.L.R.B. v. Rockaway, 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
01 Beaman v. Safeway Stores, 277 P. 2d 1010 (Ariz. 1954); Bodinson Manu-
facturing Co. v. Calif. Employment Commission, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 109 P. 2d 935
(1941); American Brake Shoe Co. v. Annunzio, 405 Ill. 44, 90 N.E. 2d 83 (1950);
Industrial Commission v. Mayer, 240 Mo. App. 1022, 223 S.W. 2d 835 (St. Louis
Ct. of App. 1949); Franke v. Unemployment Compensation Review Board, 166
Pa. Super 251, 70 A. 2d 461 (1950); and Lexes v. Industrial Commission, 243
P. 2d 964 (Utah 1952).
2The other unions in the trucking industry, such as the Transport Workers
Union of America, are of relatively negligible size and importance in most regions
of the country.
63 This section deals essentially with those Teamsters who are employed by
independent carriers.
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hurt their enemies. To reason, therefore, as some courts have,
that the picket line is a signal which sets off an automatic and
irrational response in union workers is a myth so far as the
Teamsters are concerned.6" Teamsters read picket placards, want
to know who is picketing, why the picketing is being conducted,
and how long it will continue.
In response to an inquiry from this writer, a member of the
Teamsters' international research staff explained the Teamsters'
picketing policies as follows:
I have tried to ascertain whether a formalized
policy on [organizational picketing] does exist. I have been
unable to locate anything in writing on this point. How-
ever, after discussing the problem with a number of our
officials at International headquarters, I have reached the
conclusion that it is International policy to allow each local
Teamster union to decide whether or not it will observe an
organizational picket line. I think you can readily under-
stand the basis for such a pragmatic policy. Truck trans-
portation impinges upon every industry. Blind and auto-
matic observance of organizational as well as other picket
lines would involve loss of work for our members in many,
many cases. It does not seem logical nor sensible to honor
such lines without knowledge of the facts involved on the
equity of the picketing.65
The discriminating willingness of Teamsters to cross picket
lines has been a matter of public record for many years. The late
Daniel J. Toben, former Teamsters' president, stated his views
with alacrity in 1945: "Most of those fellows who refuse to go
through a picket line are just yellow. It takes a real man to go
through a picket line when he is ordered to do so by his Inter-
national Union."66
Perpetually warring with other affiliates of the AFL-CIO, the
Teamsters' Union has sometimes used its strategic economic
power to disrupt the organizational efforts of those unions with
which it has bitter vendettas. Incensed at recent attacks on its
racket-ridden elements by members of the Executive Council of
64 Winkelman Bros. v. Teamsters, 31 LRRM 2016 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1952), is
illustrative of such cases.
65 Letter from Abraham Weiss, staff economist of the Teamsters' International
offices in Washington, to this writer, October 3, 1956.66 D. J. Toben, 42 International Teamster No. 7, p. 5, June 1945. Quoted in
C. Gregory and H. Katz, Labor Law Cases, 309 (1948).
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the AFL-CIO, Messrs. James Hoffa, Chairman of the Central Con-
ference of Teamsters, and John J. O'Rourke, President of the
Teamsters' Joint Council of New York, informed the press that
anti-Teamster unions could expect retaliation in the future when
Teamsters' members deliberately cross their picket lines.
Reporting in the New York Times of February 2, 1957, Abe
Raskin quotes Mr. O'Rourke as having said that he would order
the 125,000 members of the Teamsters' in metropolitan New
York to cross the picket lines of those unions which spend "all
their time kicking our brains out."6 7 Mr. Hoffa indicated that he
intended to adopt the same policy in the Central Conference
states, which, incidentally, includes Kentucky.
When, therefore, the Teamsters are feuding with a union
which is picketing, there is little likelihood that such union's
picket lines will be respected. At the moment, the number of
unions in this category is large.
Even when not feuding with the picketing union, in some in-
stances it has been alleged that Teamsters' locals feel more kin-
ship for the picketed employer than for the picketing union. In
such cases, the picket line is not likely to be respected. Some such
"pro-employer" sentiment has been very carefully cultivated by
employers in the retail sales and services field."' Therefore, pro-
employer feelings are a second reason why Teamsters do not
respect all picket lines.
In other instances, the evidence seems clear that Teamster
drivers are left quite free to decide individually whether vel non
to cross a particular picket line. Although when not instructed
some Teamsters do respect picket lines either as a matter of
principle or habit,"9 it is evident that other unions do not "coerce'
the Teamsters.
Some Teamsters work partially on a commission basis. This
arrangement is especially common in the Milk and Ice Cream
Drivers and Dairy Workers Division of the Teamsters'. Such
67 The New York Times, February 2, 1957, pp. 1, 9.
68 For incredible testimony of the relationship between some Teamsters'
officials and an industrial relations consultant for two hundred retail department
stores, see the testimony of Nathan Shefferman before the Senate Subcommittee
on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field on March 27, 1957.
His testimony is reported in the New York Times, March 28, 1957.
69 An interesting example of a case in which Teamsters were left on their
own, see the reported cross-examination of several truck drivers in Bellerive
Country Club v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 36 LRRM 2282, 2285 (1955).
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local unions have financial reasons for crossing picket lines,
although of course many will not do so as a matter of principle.
When the Teamsters' in a community are competing with
other unions to organize the same industries, it is self-evident
that the Teamsters' will not respect organizational picket lines
of such competitive unions at the very businesses which the
Teamsters' themselves want to organize. And, because the Team-
sters' have jurisdictional disputes with many unions, the cases are
probably many in which such lines are crossed. There are no
available figures on such disputes in their relationship to organi-
zational picketing, but these jurisdictional battles are daily in the
headlines. The Teamsters' concept of their unlimited jurisdiction
to organize has produced the aphorism that "if the job involves
movement or is near something which moves, it falls within the
Teamsters' jurisdiction." Moreover, the Teamsters' have bitterly
opposed the "no raiding" agreements, proposed so enthusiastically
by the new AFL-CIO. It has been argued that this attitude of the
Teamsters' contributes to the workers' freedom of choice be-
tween unions and therein lends to more democratic trade union-
ism, but this argument is far beyond the scope of this article.
Of course, when the Teamsters' themselves are picketing, it
is obvious that such picket lines will be supported by all Team-
sters' locals.
In most states, if an employee refuses to cross the picket line
of any union and thereby cannot perform his own job, he cannot
receive state unemployment compensation." This is an additional
reason why organizational picket lines are not always respected
by the Teamsters!
Certainly the Teamsters' are aware of the economic dangers
to their employers when they refuse to cross picket lines. Indeed,
in some very few jurisdictions, carriers have been held liable in
damages when their drivers refused to transport goods across
picket lines.' 1 Aside from possible liability in damages for his
employees' refusal to carry, there are many so-called "marginal"
70 See the cases cited in footnote 61, supra.
71 The presence of a picket line was held to be no defense in a shippers
action for damages against a carrier for violating his strict common law duty to
carry. Montgomery-Ward v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co., 128 F. Supp. 520
(D. Ore. 1954). For a comprehensive analysis of the carrier's duty under such
circumstances, see H. I. Elbert and G. H. Rebman, "Common Carriers and Picket
Lines," 1955 Wash. U. L. Q. 232.
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carriers, frequently one man operators, which simply cannot
absorb the business losses inherent in respecting all picket lines.
Such self-employed Teamsters are obviously hostile to organiza-
tional picket lines.
Finally, the Supreme Court has held that an employer may,
without violating federal law, discharge an employee who, in the
course of his employment, refuses to cross the picket line before
a consignee's business.7 2 As a practical matter, most Teamsters'
locals protect themselves from this dilemma by contracting with
their employers for the right to refuse to cross picket lines.
There are, therefore, these eight reasois why Teamsters' locals
do not respect all picket lines, a fortiori organizational picket lines,
which are far less respected than strike lines. For these reasons
it seems irrational to assert that an organizational picket line will
necessarily isolate a picketed employer from truck transportation.
Unfortunately, these factors are extremely variable, and from
community to community the Teamsters' relationship with other
unions is likely to be quite different. What percentage of organi-
zational picket lines are respected by the Teamsters' is not pub-
licly available.
Organizational Picketing and the Federal Constitution
The United States Supreme Court's decisions concerning
picketing and the First and Fourteenth Amendments have some-
thing of the character of the famous shell game: "now you see it;
now you don't."
The states were constitutionally free to do with picketing as
they liked until Thornhill v. Alabama73 in 1940 declared that a
state cannot, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, prohibit all peaceful picketing per se. Very shortly there-
after came AFL v. Swing74 which in 1941 held that states cannot
prohibit all stranger picketing per se. Swing seemed to assure
that organizational picketing was immune from state court in-
junctions, when it was peacefully conducted.
In 1949, however, the Supreme Court decided in Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co.7 5 that a state could constitutionally
72N.L.R.B. v. Rockaway, 845 U.S. 71 (1958).
73810 U.S. 88 (1940).
74 812 U.S. 821 (1941). 75886 U.S. 490 (1949).
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enjoin stranger picketing which attempted to compel an employer
to stop dealing with non-union milk peddlers. At this point the
state courts became confused and began to reexamine their
picketing decisions decided in the light of Thornhill and Swing.
By 1950, it had become perfectly apparent that the Court was
disenchanted with its equation of peaceful, stranger picketing
with free speech. In that year, the Court decided Building Serv-
ice Employees v. Gazzam,76 Hughes v. Superior Court,77 and
Teamsters' v. Hanke.
78
Gazzam held that a state could enjoin picketing by a union
which had lost a representation election, to which it had con-
sented, and which picketed notwithstanding its losing.
Hughes held that a judicially declared state policy against
racially discriminatory employment practices was an adequate
constitutional basis on which to enjoin Negroes who were picket-
ing to compel a store in a Negro neighborhood to hire a greater,
proportional number of Negro employees.
In Hanke, the Court held that a state's public policy favoring
self-employers was a valid basis on which to enjoin picketing
which attempted to put economic pressure on a business which
was operated by its owners and which had no employees.
These cases, plus the later case of Plumbers' v. Graham,
79
which held that picketing to secure a closed shop in violation
of Virginia's Right to Work law was constitutionally enjoinable,
indicated to many state courts that Swing had been overruled in
effect and that Thornhill was of doubtful potency.
Although these cases made clear that picketing and free
speech no longer constituted a perfect constitutional equation,
there was some reason to believe that they were all distinguish-
able from the ordinary organizational picketing situation. More-
over, a dictum 0 in Justice Minton's Gazzam decision suggested
to some that organizational picketing was still fully protected
under Swing.
Most state courts, however, found enough encouragement in
the new cases to conclude that organizational picketing had been
stripped of all constitutional protection. They were justified in
76 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
77 339 U.S. 460 (1950). 78 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
70 345 U.S. 192 (1953). 80 339 U.S. 532, 539 (1950).
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this reasoning because of the Supreme Court's refusal for four
years to review any organizational picketing cases arising from
the state courts. Certiorari was denied in Blue Boar v. Hotel and
Restaurant Employees,8' Way Baking Co. v. Teamsters,8 2 and
Postma Gravel Co. v. Teamsters.8 3 Appeal was denied in Pappal
v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees.
8 4
In 1956, however, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Vogt v. Teamsters,85 to re-
view the following question:
Whether peaceful picketing, having as its purpose
the publication of the facts of a labor dispute and the
organization of non-union employees, preceded by solicita-
tion of non-union employees, and conducted on a town
road bordering the situs of the dispute, and which is unac-
companied by demands of any kind upon the employer, is
constitutionally protected under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.86
This question placed squarely before the Court the typical
organizational picketing case, except for the fact that the picket-
ing in Vogt was conducted on an isolated country road, rather
than before a retail establishment which might have appealed to
the consuming public.
Vogt arose under a Wisconsin statute which prohibits all
picketing unless a majority of the employees of the employer have
selected the union as bargaining agent.8 7 The union first ap-
proached the employees and solicited their membership unsuc-
cessfully. No secret ballot election was conducted, however. No
express demands were made on the employer. Thereafter, the
picketing on an isolated country road was undertaken.
The trial court issued a permanent injunction on the em-
ployer's suit, relying on the Wisconsin statute. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin thereupon reversed the trial court, holding
that Swing protected the picketing constitutionally.88 However,
813 46 U.S. 834 (1953).
82 345 U.S. 957 (1953). 83 345 U.S. 922 (1953).
84 350 U.S. 870 (1955). 8577 S.Ct. 31 (1956).
86 Brief in support of union's petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari, p. 2.87 Wisconsin statutes, see. 103.535 prohibits picketing unless there is a "labor
dispute," and sec. 103.62(3) defines a labor dispute" as one between an em-
ployer and a majority of his employees.
88 270 Wis. 315, 71 N.W. 2d 359 (1955).
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on rehearing, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, with one dissent,
reversed itself and affirmed the trial court's injunction. In its
second opinion, the Wisconsin court said that the modifications
of the Swing doctrine had been so substantial that granting an
injunction would not violate the federal constitution.8 9 It did not
rest its decision on the statute requiring that a majority of the
employees approve the union before it may picket, but rather it
invoked the coercion doctrine, i.e. that the picketing was coercive
of the employer to coerce his employees to join the union against
their will.
In its brief on the merits, the union argued essentially that the
Swing case pr9hibited this result, and it also attacked the con-
stitutionality of the statute 0
In June of 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Vogt
decision and held that the state court's injunction was constitu-
tional.1 Speaking for a majority of the Court, Justice Frankfurter
said explicitly that picketing is fully subject to the right of the
states to balance the social interests between employers and
unions, provided only that the states' policies are rational.
The Court did not have to pass on the validity of the Wiscon-
sin statute, because it held restrictively that a state may con-
stitutionally enjoin picketing which has the effect of coercing the
employer to coerce his employees. The Court did not explore
this rationale, but it relied on the inferential findings of fact of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In brief, therefore, Justice Frank-
furter's opinion sounded the death bell for organizational picket-
ing in intrastate commerce, so far as the federal constitution in
concerned. Although he admonished the states that they cannot,
under Thornhill, proscribe all picketing per se, he made clear that
"state courts and legislatures are free to decide whether to permit
or suppress any particular picket line for any reason other than a
blanket policy against all picketing."
In a vigorous dissent, Justices Black and Douglas expressed
their fear that the Vogt decision might unleash inhibitive state
laws against picketing. Although blanket prohibitions are still
unconstitutional, the states are free to shape policies which can
89 270 Wis. 321a, 74 N.W. 2d 749 (1956).
90 Brief for the union on the merits, pp. 35-36.
91 Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. - (1956 Term No. 79, 1957).
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effectively-if not in terms-proscribe all organizational picketing.
The rationale that organizational picketing coerces the employer
to coerce his employees to join the union is the policy which many
states have already adopted and which others are certain to
adopt on the heels on the Vogt case.
That the Supreme Court did not examine the Wisconsin
statute in Vogt is of no great practical importance, for giving its
approval to the use of the coercion doctrine is enough to doom
organizational picketing. Two other states which had statutes
almost identical to the Wisconsin statute, Arizona92 and Oregon93
have declared their statutes unconstitutional, but in the cases
holding the statutes unconstitutional the courts enjoined picket-
ing by way of the coercion doctrine. Therefore, as a result of the
Vogt decision, the states can proscribe all organizational picketing
if they use the coercion doctrine.
Although the Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union has
petitioned the Supreme Court to grant I certiorari to review four
Florida picketing decisions,94 these cases are not organizational
picketing cases in the usual sense, and it is not be expected that
the Supreme Court, if it reviews the Florida cases, will soon
renege on the Vogt doctrine.
Vogt has probably set to rest the Supreme Court's extremely
nervous attitude towards picketing. Nevertheless, it is an in-
adequate decision because it relied on the coercion doctrine so
unquestioningly. The state courts are now quite free to do in-
directly what the Supreme Court forbids them to do directly.
Federal Regulation of Organizational Picketing
Organizational and recognition picketing were of course not
subject to regulation by the National Labor Relations Board
prior to the enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley) in 1947. Despite the absence of federal regula-
tion, such picketing was not of great practical importance to
most industries in interstate commerce.
In the period 1985-1947, the organization of workers met with
little resistance from workers. Employees generally welcomed
92 Baldwin v. Arizona Flame Restaurant, 40 LERM 2375 (Ariz. Sup. Ct.
199i Gilbertson v. Culinary Alliance, 204 Ore. 326, 282 P. 2d 632 (1955).
94 Sax v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 80 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1955) et seq.
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unions under Wagner Act protection, and methods more direct
and effective than picketing were available to spread the gospel
of unionism to the unorganized. Moreover, the industries organ-
ized in interstate commerce were principally in the manufactur-
ing field rather than in the retail field.
When Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley amendments in
1947, therefore, organizational picketing was not prominently in
the minds of most legislatorsf 5 Indeed, Section 8(b) (1) (A),"'
the section which would govern such picketing if it were gov-
erned under federal law at all, was not even part of the amend-
ments recommended by the Senate subcommittee, but it was in-
troduced on the Senate floor by Senator Ball, with Senator Taft's
endorsement 7 Although Senator Ball made several references to
organizational picketing, it was far from the center of the heated
debate over Section 8(b) (1) (A)'s adoption.
In the Senate floor debate on this section, Senators Taft and
Ball were persistently questioned about its potential effect on
organizing campaigns. When asked by Senator Saltonstall for the
specific meaning of the phrase "to restrain or coerce," Senator
Taft gave illustrations such as violent picketing, mass picketing,
and threatsf 8
Although pre-enactment legislative debates are not always the
wisest guides to Congress' meaning and intention, these debates
were especially reliable because their participants were extremely
knowledgeable on labor matters. Moreover, these debates were
subjected to close public interest and scrntiny, and both the
sponsors and critics of the Taft-Hartley amendments must have
realized that their words would be used subsequently for purposes
of interpretation.
The National Labor Relations Board and its General Counsel
have since 1947 frequently alluded to these debates. As demon-
strative of Congress' intent not to regulate organizational picket-
ing, the following statement by Senator Taft, in response to a
question from Senator Morse, has been cited as authoritative:
95 93 Cong. Rec., Part 4, pp. 4434-4487, May 2, 1947.
9 6 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. sec.
158(b) (1) (A).
97 A. Cox, Labor Law Cases 873-876 (Srd Ed. 1954).
98 Supra note 95.
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Mr. President, I can see nothing in the pending
measure which ... would in some way outlaw [organiza-
tional] strikes. It would outlaw threats against employees.
It would not outlaw anybody striking who wants to strike.
It would not prevent anyone using the strike in a legitimate
way, conducting peaceful picketing, or employing per-
suasion. All it would do would be to outlaw such restraint
and coercion as would prevent people going to work, if
they wished to go to work.99
That Section 8(b) (1) (A) was not designed to preclude
organizational picketing is further supported by the enactment
of Section 8(c), the so-called free speech section.1' °
Another significant reason to interpret Section 8(b) (1) (A)
so as not to proscribe organizational picketing is that, when it
was enacted in 1947, the Supreme Court had not yet retreated
from the forthright doctrine of free speech protection embodied
in ThornhillI0 ' and Swing,0 2 and such picketing may then have
seemed constitutionally immune from Congressional regulation.
The National Labor Relations Board has dealt with only one
recognition picketing case under Section 8(b) (1) (A). This was
Carpenters (Watson's Specialty Store) 10 3 in which the union de-
manded that the employer sign a closed shop contract for its
installers, none of whom belonged to the union. The employer
refused this demand as well as a subsequent demand that his non-
union installers be replaced with union men. These refusals were
followed by picketing which stated merely that the employees
were non-union. Although the General Counsel issued a com-
plaint on the employer's charge that the union had violated Sec-
tion 8(b) (1) (A), the trial examiner concluded from the Senate
debates that such picketing was not proscribed by the scope of
that section. Without discussion, the Board unanimously adopted
the trial examiner's report, citing as further authority its decision
in National Maritime Union (The Texas Co.).104
In this latter case, it was argued that the N.M.U.'s refusal to
bargain in good faith also constituted restraint of employees in
09 Supra note 95 at p. 4436.
10 0 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 186, 29 U.S.C. see.
158(c).
1013 10 U.S. 88 (1940). 102 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
103 80 NLRB 533 (1948). 104 78 NLRB 971 (1948).
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violation of Sec. 8(b) (1) (A). The Board rejected this argu-
ment, reasoning from the Senate debates that Sec. 8(b) (1) (A)
was intended principally to prohibit violence and threats of
violence. In its dicta, the Board also stated clearly that organiza-
tional picketing was not outlawed by this section.
Since 1948, the N.L.R.B. has not reexamined its interpretation
of Sec. 8(b) (1) (A) so far as organizational and recognition
picketing are concerned. Although the critics of this interpreta-
tion are many, there seems little likelihood that it will be over-
ruled. The General Counsel has consistently issued administra-
tive rulings refusing to seek injunctions against such picketing.10 5
Rumors that Congress will be asked to amend Taft-Hartley
to outlaw organizational picketing are rife. The vigor with which
business associations have urged such legislation before state
legislatures lends substance to the rumor. Moreover, as the AFL-
CIO comes closer to launching a full scale organizing campaign
in the retail fields, the pressure on Congress from business groups
will become progressively greater. Such a campaign has been in
the drafting stages for several years. 06
It is an interesting anomaly that the N.L.R.B. has interpreted
the guarantee against restraints or coercion of employees in Sec.
8(b) (1) (A) so as to permit organizational picketing, whereas
most of the states have interpreted comparable statutes so as to
proscribe it.-
07
In one area of federal labor law, organizational picketing is
proscribed. Where one union has been certified by the N.L.R.B.,
Section 8(b) (4) (C) 08 of Taft-Hartley prohibits picketing by a
158(b) (4) (C).
rival union.
The principal case decided by the Board under this section
is Teamsters (Union Chevrolet Co.) 109 which enjoined the Team-
sters from picketing after a rival union had been certified. The
Board has reached the same result when an individual, rather
'0 5 Administrative rulings of the NLRB General Counsel: Case No. 1008, 84
LRRM 1512 (1954); Case No. 1069, 85 LRRM 1583 (1954).
306 A. J. Goldberg, AFL-CIO: Labor United 221.
107 In Blue Boar v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 254 S.W. 2d 335 (Ky.
1952), the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that minority organizational picketing
violated KRS 836.180(1) and (2), which protect employees from "unfair or
illegal acts or practices or resort to violence, intimidation, threats or coercion.
108 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 186, 29 U.S.C. sec.
109 96 NLRB 957 (1951).
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than a union, had been designated by the employees as their bar-
gaining agent, and a rival union picketed the employer. Bonnaz
Workers (Gemsco, Inc.)11o The Board, however, reserved specifi-
cally the question of whether organizational picketing which had
for its purpose the solicitation of members after the present
union's certification had expired would be lawful."' In both the
above cited cases, the Board found that the unions' purpose was
to seek immediate, rather than future, recognition as exclusive
bargaining agent.
When the employees in a representation election conducted
by the N.L.R.B. have chosen "no union" in preference to a union,
organizational picketing thereafter is lawful, for Sec. 8 (b) (4) (C)
by its terms prohibits rival picketing against another union's certi-
fication.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that,
even where a rival union has been certified, Sec. 8(b) (4) (C)
does not proscribe all organizational picketing per se. Douds v.
Bakery Workers."2 In this case, where the defendant union be-
gan organizational picketing after it lost an N.L.R.B. election to
a rival union, the Court of Appeals affimed the District Court's
refusal to issue a preliminary injunction. The picketing in this
case was conducted at the employer's isolated plant site, where
no customers or delivery truck drivers were influenced by the
picket placards. Such picketing, said the Court, was not violative
of Sec. 8(b) (4) (C) because no employees of "any" employer
had been induced to engage in a strike or in a concerted refusal
to use the goods of the picketed employer. The Court held that
this picketing might lawfully be conducted to encourage mem-
bership in the union so as to win the next certification election.
This case has been followed in the Second Circuit even where
a few truck drivers were influenced by the picketing."13 In two
recent decisions, however, the N.L.R.B. has said that it will not
follow the Second Circuit's view of Sec. 8(b) (4) (C)."
4
110 111 NLRB 82 (1955).
111 Id. at 83; supra note 2.
112 224 F. 2d 49 (2d Cir. 1955). The Second Circuit reiterated its position
when the NLRB sought enforcement of its finding of a see. 8 (b) (4) (C ) unfair
labor practice against the union in 40 LRRM 2107 (1957).
113 Douds v. Knit Goods Workers, 147 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. N.Y. 1957).
114 Knit Goods Workers (Packard Knitwear), 118 NLRB No. 71 (1957);
Knit Good Workers (James Knitting Co.), 117 NLRB No. 196 (1957).
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The Problems of Federal or State jurisdiction
When a business is clearly engaged in intrastate commerce,
state law governs organizational picketing in all aspects, except
so far as the federal constitution may impose minimum require-
ments of due process. As to businesses which are engaged in in-
terstate commerce, the question of whether state or federal law
governs organizational picketing is far more complicated.
The states, under the direct conflict rule, cannot deny rights
which are guaranteed by federal labor law" 5 to employees en-
gaged in interstate commerce, nor can the states regulate the
same activity which might potentially result in a conflict with the
regulation of the N.L.R.B. 116
Some activities in the labor field, however, are reserved to the
states as a matter of their general police powers, even though the
same activities might be governed by federal law and even
though the business is engaged in interstate commerce. The
states are free, for example, to regulate mass picketing117 and
violent picketing,"8 although the N.L.R.B. may also regulate
them.
In Garner v. Teamsters,"- however, the states were held to
have no jurisdiction to regulate activity which might constitute a
union unfair labor practice, if the business is engaged in interstate
commerce and therein subject to federal law. Such regulatory
power, said the Supreme Court, has been preempted by federal
law as part of a comprehensive and exclusive governing scheme,
and such power is to be exercised only by the N.L.R.B.
Garner, which arose from Pennsylvania state courts, was an
organizational picketing case. Although the Supreme Court said
that the facts alleged in the trial court constituted a union unfair
labor practice, Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court indicated in
one dictum that, if the facts alleged did not constitute an unfair
labor practice, the picketing might, nevertheless, be a protected
activity under federal law, which would also have the effect of
ousting the states of regulatory jurisdiction.
Soon after Garner, the Supreme Court held in Weber v. An-
115 Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
116 LaCrosse Telephone Corp. v. WERB, 836 U.S. 18 (1949).
117 Allen-Bradley v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
118 UAW v. WERB, 351 U.S. 266 (1956). 119 346 U.S. 495 (1953).
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heuser-Busch120 that Missouri courts could not enjoin conduct
which was alleged to violate Missouri's anti-restraint of trade
statute, because the facts alleged also constituted an unfair labor
practice. The N.L.R.B. again was said to have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the activity. The statute of Missouri which allegedly
had been violated, incidentally, was the same one which had
been violated in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. 2'
In other decisions, the Supreme Court-on a case by case
basis-has held that the states may regulate acts which are neither
protected nor proscribed by federal law, e.g. quickie-strikes.2 2
It has also allowed the states to entertain damages actions for
acts which constitute unfair labor practices, even though the
business is engaged in interstate commerce..
23
Although this case by case approach has defined some of the
general limits on the right of the states to regulate union activi-
ties which may or may not also be governed by federal law, the
problem of which law governs is complicated by the N.L.R.B.'s
power to establish its own "commerce" standards in terms of the
dollar volume of business.
124
Until very recently, the courts were in wide disagreement over
whether the state courts could act to regulate activities, including
organizational picketing, where the N.L.R.B. had declined juris-
diction on the grounds that the particular business was in com-
merce but did not meet its dollar commerce standards.
Some courts reasoned that, if the N.L.R.B. declined jurisdic-
tion, the states necessarily were free to apply their own laws,
whereas other courts reasoned that the preemption doctrine of
Garner and Anheuser-Busch excluded the operation of state law
as to such businesses, despite the N.L.R.B.'s refusal to accept
jurisdiction. A very few states very appropriately reasoned that,
although the N.L.R.B. had declined jurisdiction in a particular
case, if the business was engaged in interstate commerce, it was
the duty of the state courts to provide a forum for the administra-
tion of federal law.
120 348 U.S. 468 (1955). 121 336 U.S. 490 (1950).
122 International Union v. WERB, 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
123 Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Co., 347 U.S. 656
(1953).
1
2 4 The Board's dollar jurisdictional commerce standards are reported in I
CCH Labor Law Reporter (4th Ed.), sec. 1610 (1954).
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In a rather surprising opinion, the Supreme Court resolved
this dilemma in March of 1957 in Cuss v. Utah Labor Board.
2 5
The Supreme Court held in this case that, if the business is en-
gaged in interstate commerce but the N.L.R.B. declines to exer-
cise jurisdiction under its own dollar commerce standards, the
states are, nevertheless, deprived of all regulatory power under
the preemption doctrine, unless they have been ceded jurisdiction
by the N.L.R.B. The Board has never ceded its jurisdiction, be-
cause cession is permitted only when a state's labor relations laws
are identical in text and in decisional interpretation to that of
federal law.
Effectively, therefore, the Supreme Court's decision in Guss
has created a legal "no man's land," where neither state nor
federal law may be applied to businesses which are engaged in
interstate commerce, but which fail to meet the N.L.R.B.'s dollar
standards.
Until Congress acts to fill this void, organizational picketing
in connection with such businesses is simply unregulated. This
result seems jurisprudentially shocking, to say the least, but it is
one of the problems which Congress has helped to create by fail-
ing to appropriate enough money to enable the N.L.R.B. to handle
more cases. Of course, it may be expected that Congress will act
soon to resolve this matter, either by way of giving such cases to
the states to apply their own law, by requiring the N.L.R.B. to
hear all such cases, or by requiring the states to provide a forum
for this federal law.
As a matter of practice, the Guss case's result is not perfectly
clear, for a union itself cannot seek an injunction in federal courts
against state court proceedings against it; 126 only the N.L.R.B.
has been held entitled to seek to enjoin state court proceedings
which concern conduct which allegedly lies in the exclusive
jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B.'
2 7
A Conclusion With Recommendations
As a matter of social morality, unions ought never to establish
picket lines thoughtlessly. The potential economic consequences
325 858 U.S. - (1957).
126 Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511 (1955).
127 Capital Service v. NLRB, 847 U.S. 501 (1954).
[Vol. 46,
ORcANIZATIONAL PICEB3NG
to the employer should be carefully balanced against the po-
tential benefits of communication with the unorganized em-
ployees.
If establishing a picket line is the most certain method of
reaching the attention of workers and of demonstrating union
solidarity to workers who might otherwise fear their employer's
economic power, it should be used. However, when a picket line
appears without forewarning, when no other efforts have been
made to reach the employees, and when a demand is then made
on the employer for a contract, such use of the economic power
of picketing can not easily be justified in terms of the free choice
of unorganized employees.
Both the employer and the union have a serious interest in the
wages and conditions of the employees of a non-union business.
The employer is interested not only in keeping his labor costs low
but also in avoiding all economic barriers to the operation of his
business. The stranger union, however, is legitimately interested
both in improving the wages and conditions of the non-union
employees and in eliminating substandard wages and conditions
which threaten the economic status of unionized employees
throughout an industry. If these interests of both the employer
and the union are bona fide, a legal balance should be drawn by
way of rational regulation, not by a flat, legal rule of thumb.
The aphorism that the organizational picket line coerces the
employer to coerce his employees is too glib and is often factually
unsound. It may be the picket line alone which can prevent an
employer's using his inherent economic power to coerce his em-
ployees to refrain from having any dealings at all with the union.
Moreover, the legal conclusion that picketing is coercive
merely because a demand for recognition has been made on the
employer is equally unsound. The same courts which employ
this reasoning would not enjoin the employer's signing such a
contract with a union voluntarily, nor would these courts enjoin
an employer's discharging employees who join or who sympathize
with the union.
As under federal law, the more rational, regulatory balance
might be drawn in permitting organizational picketing for a
reasonable time before a secret ballot election is conducted. If
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the courts are genuinely concerned with the employees' free
choice, it seems almost disingenuous to deny the union's right
to picket unless there is some certainty that the employees-hav-
ing been permitted to express their choice in secrecy-do not want
the union to represent them.
The courts ought not be satisfied with a petition circulated by
the employer and signed by his employees, nor should they be
satisfied with testimony in open court to the same effect. Only
the secret ballot is fairly calculated to reflect the true wishes
of employees.
If the employer refuses to agree to a secret election, such
refusal should be viewed as bad faith sufficient to deny the extra-
ordinary writ of injunction. This requirement of a secret ballot
should apply to unions as well, for they should be enjoined if
they do not agree to an election after they have had a reasonable
time in which to organize the employees with the aid of a picket
line. Such a prerequisite to issuing an injunction would not be
unwarranted judicial legislation, for the requirement may be
stated in equity as a fundamental matter of good faith, i.e. he who
seeks equity must do equity.
Too many state courts seem willing to enjoin picketing on the
slightest legal pretexts when the union is a stranger to the pick-
eted business. Freed now from the constitutional inhibitions of
the Swing doctrine, the state courts should weigh the social in-
terests more carefully in organizational picketing cases. There
is substantial reason to believe that, unless the Supreme Court
works a miracle by overcoming Vogt, organizational picketing is
a dead device in most states, and its death was produced not by
logic but by an epithet, "coercion."
The state courts would be well advised to consider the ad-
monition of Pope Pius XII in his 1952 Christmas message:
The right of association is a fundamental one for
workers. It is given by nature itself. It is the duty of the
state to protect this right and to facilitate the exercise there-
of. No power may deny it to any group of workers what-
ever, provided that, in a given association, nothing is op-
posed to the common good and the security of the state.1
28
128 Christmas Message of Pope Pius XII, December 24, 1952, paragraph 174.
Quoted in Keller, The Case for Right to Work Laws 125.
